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Abstract: A central claim of Jones & Love’s (J&L’s) article is that
Bayesian Fundamentalism is empirically unconstrained. Unless
constraints are placed on prior beliefs, likelihood, and utility functions,
all behaviour – it is proposed – is consistent with Bayesian rationality.
Although such claims are commonplace, their basis is rarely justified.
We fill this gap by sketching a proof, and we discuss possible solutions
that would make Bayesian approaches empirically interesting.
Although the authors are perhaps attacking a straw-man, we
agree with many points raised in Jones & Love’s (J&L’s) critique
of “Bayesian Fundamentalism.” It is our objective here to
strengthen their claim that Bayesian Fundamentalism is empiri-
cally unconstrained; although such claims are often made, their
basis is not usually fleshed out in any detail. This is such a key
part of the case that we sketch a proof and discuss possible
solutions.
Without placing constraints on prior beliefs, likelihood, and
utility functions, claims of Bayesian rationality are empirically
empty: any behaviour is consistent with that of some rational
Bayesian agent. To illustrate this point, consider a simple prob-
ability learning task in which a participant has two response
options (e.g., press a left or a right button), only one of which
will be rewarded. On each trial t, the participant gives a response
xt ¼ f0,1}, and then observes the placement of the reward
yt ¼ {0,1}, which is under control of the experimenter. The ques-
tion is whether the assumption of Bayesian rationality places any
restrictions on the response sequence for a given reward
sequence.
In Bayesian inference, the prior distribution and likelihood
(model of the task) assign a probability P(yt¼ Sj) to each possible
reward sequence. Without further constraints, we can take this
probability to be proportional to a value vj  0. After observing
y1, some of the rewarded sequences are impossible, and learning
consists of setting the probability of these sequences to 0 and
then renormalizing. For example, consider a task with three
trials. The possible reward (and response) sequences are given
in Table 1. Assume the sequence of rewards is y ¼ S1. After
observing y1 ¼ 0, S5 to S8 are impossible and the posterior prob-
abilities become P(Sjjy1) ¼ vj/Skvk, for j, k ¼ 1, . . ., 4, and
P(Sjjy1)¼0 for j ¼ 5, . . ., 8. After observing y2 ¼ 0, S3 and S4
are also impossible, and the posterior probabilities become
P(Sjjy1) ¼ vj/Sjvk, for j, k ¼ 1, 2, and P(Sjjy1) ¼ 0, for j ¼ 3,
4. After observing y3 ¼ 0, only S1 remains with a probability 1.
A rational Bayesian agent gives responses which maximise his or
her subjective expected utility, conditional upon the previously
observed rewards. For simplicity, assume the utility of a correct
prediction is u(yt ¼ xt)¼1 and that of an incorrect prediction is
u(yt= xt) ¼ 0, so that the expected utilities correspond to the pos-
terior predicted probabilities of the next reward. The crucial point
is that in this general setup, we can always choose the values vj to
make any sequence of responses xt conform to that of a maximizer
of subjective expected utility. For example, suppose the sequence
of rewards is S1 and the sequence of responses is S8. The
first response x1¼1 implies that v1þ v2þ v3þ v4v5v6v7v8; the
second response x21 implies that v1v2v3v4; the third response
x3 1 implies that v1v2. One choice of values consistent with this
is vjj. For any response sequence, we can choose values which
adhere to such implied inequalities, so behaviour is always consist-
ent with a rational Bayesian agent. Although we have considered a
rather simple situation with a small number of trials, this result
generalizes readily to other sequential learning tasks such as cat-
egory learning (for a related, more general and formal proof,
see, e.g., Zambrano 2005). The problem becomes even more
severe if we allow the utilities to depend on previous outcomes,
which may not be entirely implausible (e.g., a third misprediction
in a row may be more unpleasant than the first).
One may object that the particular method of Bayesian infer-
ence sketched here is implausible: Would someone really assign
probabilities to all possible reward sequences? Maybe not expli-
citly, but in an abstract sense, this is what Bayesian modelling
boils down to. Granted, the values assigned have been arbitrary,
but that is exactly the point: Bayesian rationality is silent about
the rationality of priors and likelihoods, yet some of these seem
more rational than others. Thus, rationality hinges on more than
adherence to Bayesian updating and utility maximization.
Is the claim of Bayesian inference and decision making always
empirically empty? No. For instance, the assumption that
rewards are exchangeable (that they can be reordered without
affecting the probabilities) places equivalence restrictions on
the values v such that, given a sufficient number of trials, some
response sequences would violate utility maximization. Exchan-
geability is crucial to the convergence of posterior probabilities
and the decisions based on them. Another option would be to
let participants make multiple decisions while keeping their
Table 1 (Speekenbrink & Shanks). Possible reward and response
sequences (Sj) in a simple learning task with three trials (t)
t S1 S2 S3 S4 S5 S6 S7 S8
1 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1
2 0 0 1 1 0 0 1 1
3 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1
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information base (posterior probabilities) constant, so that
intransitive decisions become possible. More generally, testable
conditions of Bayesian rationality can be found in the axioms of
subjective expected utility theory (e.g., Savage 1954). Empirically
meaningful claims of Bayesian rationality should minimally
ensure the possibility that the data can falsify these axioms. Axio-
matic tests are “model-free” in the sense that they do not rely on a
particular choice of prior distribution and utility function. Such
tests should be a first step in rational analysis; if the assumption
of Bayesian rationality is not rejected, one can then look for
priors and utilities which match the observed behaviour. Given
rich-enough data, this search can be guided by conjoint measure-
ment procedures (e.g., Wallsten 1971).
To conclude, while “Bayesian Fundamentalism” is generally
unconstrained, by placing appropriate restrictions, the assump-
tion of Bayesian rationality is subject to empirical testing and,
when not rejected, can help guide model building.
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